EFFECTS OF STRONG GEOMAGNETIC STORMS ON NORTHERN RAILWAYS IN RUSSIA A. V. BELOV, RUSSIA, S. P. GAIDASH, RUSSIA, E. A. EROSHENKO, RUSSIA, V. L. LOBKOV, RUSSIA, R. PIRJOLA, FINLAND, L.TRICHTCHENKO4, CANADA. EMC, 2007

Сбои в работе железнодорожной автоматики во время магнитных бурь ИЗМИРАН Х.Д.Канониди В период активной фазы магнитных бурь г., и наблюдались отказы в работе ж/д устройств СЦБ (сигнализация, централизация и блокировка) на станциях Шестизерский, Шозма, Лельма, Шалакуша, Левша, Ивакша, Укса, Плесецкая, Шелекса, Емца, Летнеозерский. Отказы заключаются в неустойчивой работе электрических рельсовых цепей частотой 25 Гц. На пульт табло дежурных по станциям спонтанно появлялись ложные (без подвижного состава) занятости путевых секций по главным путям Занятости наблюдались последовательно, т.е. загорается красная полоска на первой рельсовой цепи, затем на второй, третьей и тд. Освобождение рельсовых цепей, т.е. погасание красной полосы происходило также волнообразно. При этом напряжение источников питания по переменному току было в норме. Напряжение падало именно в самой рельсовой цепи. На путевом реле при норме В наблюдалось падение до 6 В. Также изменилось напряжение и на рельсах, как на питающем, так и на релейном контакте. ………………………………………. ……………………………………….. Зам. начальника Няндомской дистанции сигнализации и связи В.Л. Лобков Начальнику службы сигнализации, централизации и блокировки Северной ЖД ФЕДЯЕВУ Ю.А. Р А П О Р Т В ночь 6 на 7 апреля 2000 г. на участке Няндома – Огозерская неустойчиво работали рельсовые цепи. 1. Хронологическая последовательность ложной занятости рельсовых цепей: станция Плесецкая. Кратковременная ложная занятость р.ц. НАП, НДП,3-5 СП, ЧАП 1-го участка приближения по нечетному пути ст. Шозма. Тоже р.ц. 3-5 СП, 1-9 СП НДП, 4-8 СП 2-6 СП. ст.Лепша. Тоже р.ц., НАП, 1-5 СП 39 СП, ЧАП, 1-е участки приближения по четному и нечетному путям. Ст. Кукса. Тоже р.ц. НП, 2 БП, 7 СП, 27 СП, ЧП, 10 СП, 1 участок удаление по нечетному пути. …………………………….. 2. Характер занятости. Кратковременный, как правило, несколько секунд до минут. Самый длительный период 3 мин. Рельсовые пути занимались на станциях бессистемно, последовательно одна за другой или сразу несколько. Освобождались также. Все перечисленные р.ц. расположены по главному ходу. 3. Питающее напряжение по фидерам было в пределах нормы. Претензий нет. Для выяснения причины энергетики отключали на всем участке линию АБ, т.е все станции и перегоны были переключены на 2-й фидер. Ложные занятости продолжались в той же форме. ………………………….. 7. На следующий день производился осмотр состояния р.ц. и измерения напряжений на элементах рельсовых путей. Явных недостатков, могущих вызвать ложную занятость, обнаружено не было. …………………… Зам. начальника дистанции по СЦБ В.Л. Лобков

A more detailed analysis indicates a coincidence between the time of anomalies and the most active geomagnetic periods with accuracy up to hours. It is noteworthy to emphasize that these periods were selected by the information on the railway, but not by geophysical situation. We did not receive any information on similar problem in the quiescent periods. The reason of these phenomena may really be the currents induced in the system of railway automatics. They seem to be occurred often enough at high latitudinal railways where throttle transformers included in the automatic signalization system Last years IZMIRAN was receiving a lot of reports from Nyandoma part (63-64 N) of the Northern railway and Gorky railway about the cases of failure in the railway signalization, centralization and block (SCB) system at the number of railway stations throughout the period 1989, They reported about some false signals at the duty tables regarding blockage on the tracks along the main railway that caused a delay in the train moving. The time and anomaly characteristics are put in protocols. It is characteristic that checking of the apparatus after these anomaly signals indicated their properly functioning. Comparison of the received reports with the data on the geomagnetic field variations revealed well pronounced correlation between anomalies in the railway automatics and big disturbances of the geomagnetic field during the greatest magnetic storms in these years.

Ap-index The first signal

Gorky branch of the railway. Rail distances where failures during the geomagnetic storms were recorded: red lines-March 1989, green marks-in October-November 2003.

Report to the Chief of the Main Department of the Gorky Rail Ways from the Service of Signaling and Communication from On March 14, 1989, starting from 0:45 (local time, ~ 20:45 UT on 13.03) took place the numerous cases of appearance of 1-2 minutes duration signals about false blockage of the railway tracks. Especially intensively it occurred in the following parts of railway: Kovrov-Gorokhovets, Vladimir distance; Shakhunja-Shamanikha, Gorky-Moscow distance; Svecha- Kotelnich, Lyangasov distance; Arzamas- Kanash, Arzamasskaya distance; Krasnoufimsk-Soldatka, Krasnoufimskoj distance. All these sections are equipped by electric traction of variable current and rail chains of 25 Hz. Rail chains in the four sections are continues, with relay DSCH-13, and on the second section they operate in the pulsed mode. In the 1-st and 4-th sections the situation with false signal occurred during the several minutes, in all others sections it repeated numerous times during 3-4 hours. Checking in the section 5 (Krasnoufimsk-Soldatka) showed the voltage on the railway relays at these moments was unstable, it decreased sometimes down to level of slack off the relay. Under asymmetry of the rail way resistance (In the short length rail chains its level because of the different resistance in the throttle crosspieces and rail bars is much higher than in the long ways) and appearance of rectification properties in some not tight contacts (bars and bridges) the addition magnetize of throttle transformer DT arises that leads to a decrease of the inlet resistance on the feeding and relay ends and to the voltage fall on the way relay. Simultaneously at that time on the 3-rd, 4-th and 5-th distances the anomalies in the communication devices were observed. I ask you to consider a possibility to protect SCB operating against the analogous phenomena. Chief of the SCB service V.A. Kasparov

Nyandoma railway division Report from to the Chief of the Signalization, Centralization and Blockage (SCB) Service on the Northern railway Fedyaevu Yu. A. In the night from 6 to 7 April 2000 the operating of rail chains in the section Nyandoma- Obozerskaya was very unstable. Below chronological sequence of the false rail chain occupation is presented: :47 LT. Station Plesetskaya. Short time false blockage of the rail chains NAP, NDP, 3- 5 SP, CHAP, on the 1-st section of incoming by the odd way; :10 LT. Station Shozhma. The same rail chain 3-5 SP, 1-9 SP, NDP, 4-8 SP, 2-6 SP; Station Lepsha. NAP, 1-5 SP, 3-9 SP, CHAP, CHDP, the first sections of incoming ways; Station Puksa, the same rail chain NP, 2BP, 7 SP, 27 SP, CHP, 1AP, 10 SP, the first section of moving off by the odd way; , 22:25 LT. Station Ivaksha, rail chain 3-5 SP, 1-7 SP, 1 P, CHAP, CHAPD, 2-4 SP, 6-8 SP , 22:26 LT. Station Sheleksa, rail chains 1SP, 1/13P, 13 SP, 1P, CHBP, CHVP, CHDAP, CHDBP, CHDVP, 1 SP, SP, 1-st section of moving off by the both ways , 0:03 LT. Station Ivaksha, 3-5 SP, 1-7 SP, 1P, CHAP, CHAPD, 2-4 SP, 6-8SP , 0:10 LT. Station Puksa, NP, 11 BP, 7 SP, 27 SP, CHP, 1AP, 10 SP, the 1-st section of moving off by the odd way, section of incoming 2PP , 0:13 LT. Station Shozhma, 3-5 SP, 1-9 SP, NDP, 4-8 SP. 2-6 SP , 0:14 LT. Station Lelma, NDP, 7 SP, the 1-st section of moving off by even way , 0:15 LT. Station Lepsha, NAP, 1-5 SP, 3-9 SP, CHAP, CHDP, the first section of incoming by both ways; Station Sheleksa, 1 SP, 1/13 P, 13 SP, 1P, CHBP, CHVP, CHDAP, CHDBP, CHDVP, 2SP, SP , 1:03 LT. Station Shalakusha, 1/11 P, SP, 4-12 SP , 1:10 LT. Station Plesetskaya, NAP, NDP, 3-5 SP, CHAP, the 1-st section of incoming by the odd way , 4:40 LT. Station Yemtsa, 1/11 P, SP, CHAP, CHDP, 2-8 SP, 4-10 SP, 24 SP , 3:50 LT. Station Shestiozersky, NDP, 1P, section of incoming, 1PP.

Anomalies in the railway automatic during the magnetic storms on the Northern Rail Way. Nyandoma distance. Stations: Shozhma, Lelma, Shalakusha, Lepsha, Ivaksha, Plesetskaya, Sheleksa, Puksa, Yemtsa, Letneozerskaya, Shestiozerskaya.

GIC Monitoring during the Storm of April 2000, Kp and Dst indices, and failures in the railway operating In the night from 6 to 7 April 2000 the operating of rail chains in the section Nyandoma-Obozerskaya was very unstable. Character of false blockage is of short duration, as a rule from several second up to minute. Rail chains were occupied unsystematically, one after another or several ones simultaneously. All blocked chains are placed along the main way. Anomalies in the SCB system started at the time of Kp increase – well before the strong GIC variations.

Character of occupation (blockage) is of short duration, as a rule from several second up to minute, the longest one was 3 minutes. Rail chains were occupied unsystematically, one after another or several ones simultaneously. All mentioned above chains are placed along the main way. Voltage on the feeders was in normal range. All stations and spans had been switched over to the second feeder, but signals on the false blockage were continued as before. Measurements on the rail relays showed floating voltage (deviation from normal 25V down to 6-7V). Under 9-10 V the relay was de-energized. The voltage on the exit of converters (the panels PP 25-ETSK) was normal and stable. Rail chains in all the stations are made by the album RC25-DSSH16-ET50-S-93, on the spans- by RC25-01P. The false blockage on the spans, except of the part of arriving and moving off, was not fixed, perhaps, because of the short duration. Checking of the rail chains and their voltage on the next day ( ) did not show any reasons for false blockage. Asymmetry of the traction current at the station Plesetskaya was higher than normal one (4%) on the rail chains 2PP, CHAP, CHDP, CH2U, NAP, 1PP (from 4.8% to 33%). At the rest station it was in the normal range. On this part of northern railway the system is applied of a contact net with shielding wire which is ground connected in every 5-6 km on the middle point DT, and at the stations it is ground connected near every input N, CH, ND,CHD. On the spans Ivaksha-Puksa-Plesetskaya-Sheleksa, Sheleksa-Yemtsa,on the stations Puksa, Plesetskaya, Sheleksa the spark intervals IMP-62 are absent. This is an explanation of the great asymmetry in traction current. Deputy of chief on the SCB service V. L. Lobkov

Report to IZMIRAN from Nyandoma section of the Northern rail way, from In the night from 15 to 16 July the situation of the 6 April was repeated. Please, confirm, if there was again the strong geomagnetic storm? Chief of Nyandoma SH CH V.S. Zubkov Report to IZMIRAN, from Nyandoma section of the Northern rail way. We inform you that on 18 September 2000 again the failures in the operating of electric rail chains were observed: Station Lelma throughout the interval 2:10- 4:50 LT Station Lepsha 7:35-11:45 LT Station Ivaksha 0:43- 5:00 LT Station Puksa 2:30- 8:10 LT Station Yemtsa 4:10- 4:55 LT The most number of failures occurred in the SCB devices on the station Ivaksha where unstable operating lasted up to 16 hrs (LT). Please, inform us on forthcoming storms, then, we shall concentrate the specialists and measure apparatus to define character of influence and points of SCB which are mostly exposed to the magnetic storm effect.

Report from to IZMIRAN Report from to IZMIRAN On , and the failures in the railway system SCB were observed at the stations Shestiozerskaya, Shozhma, Lelma, Shalakusha, Lepsha, Ivaksha, Puksa, Plesetskaya, Sheleksa, Yemtsa, Letneozersky. The anomalies revealed as unstable operating of the electric rail chains with current of 25 Hz. On duty tables at different stations spontaneously appeared the false signals on the railway blockage. They appeared consequently: the red belt lights on the first rail chain, then on the second, third and so on. Along this the voltage on the feeders by the variable current was normal, but voltage level in the rail chain fell down: from normal 30V to 6V. The voltages changed also in the rails, both on the feeding and relay ends. During the periods on and the failures occurred in the operating of SCB system because of the breach in operating of electric rail chains (25 Hz frequency) at the stations: Shozhma, Leljma, Shalakusha, Lepsha, Ivaksha, Puksa, Plesetskaya, Sheleksa, Yemtsa, Letneozersky. We ask you to direct in our address a project of Agreement accordingly to which you could deliver to us a forecast on forthcoming magnetic storms.

Geomagnetic field measurements nearly to Nyandoma distance ( Karpogory, 63.58; 44.30)

Data from Karpogory magnetometer during the events in October-November 2003 Beginning of the sharp changes in the geomagnetic field components coincided with the start of anomalies In the SCB automatic system Horizontal red lines correspond to a duration of failures in the SCB system in the Nyandoma part of Northern railways

Block-scheme of the railway signalization system. In a distance Konosha-Nyandoma the shielding wire goes by transit way whereas along Nyandoma-Oboserskaya distance the shielding wire is broken at every station and the ends of wire contact middle points of DT In result the reversal traction current is concentrated at the rail chains close to throttle transformer (DT-1-150) of the nearest traffic lights and the chains between of this station lights because of the absent shielding wire here. As a consequence DT works in overloading regime that leads to the fall of feeding voltages on the relay contacts and to their shorting. Color pictures show throttle transformer DT

Report of the railway laboratory of Automatic and Telemechanic on the study of failures in the rail chains occurred during the October 2003 (Kirov branch). Failure characteristics: There was a short time (around 1 minute) false blockage on the 14 rail tracks in the period from 22:15 LT on 29 October to 0:16 LT on 31 October. Chronology of anomalies is shown in Table. Mass failure in the rail chain operating is analogous to those under ice-covered phenomena on the contact wire. In present case, most probably, it is a result of induced electro-magnetic currents in the short rail chains. Under presence of even small asymmetry (within the norm limits) in the rail chains and with appearance of rectification properties by the parts of rail junction (crosspieces, bridges) these induced currents are sufficient for addition magnetize of throttle transformer DT This leads to a decrease of resistance its main winding on the feeding or relay ends (perhaps on both also) and to the fall of voltage on a rail relay. Table of the anomaly chronology in October 2003

List of failures in the SCB devices in November 2004 and January 2005 (by the reports from Nyandoma section) 8 November 2004 Station Plesetskaya 02:15-2:48 LT. False blockage, rc CHAP Station Shalakusha-Lelma 02:40-3:13 LT. False blockage, rc CHAPD Station Puksa 02:56-3:41 LT. False blockage, rc 7SP Station Sheleksa 05:22-7:05 LT. False blockage, rc 1/13P Station Ivaksha-Puksa 9: LT. False blockage, rc 1/13P 9 November 2004 Station Sheleksa 22:50-23:55 LT. False blockage, rc 1/13P; Station Ivaksha 23:18-23:50 LT. False blockage, CHAPD, 2-4SP, 1-7SP; Station Lelma-Shalakusha 23:50-00:20 LT. False blockage, rc 1/13P, CHVP; Station Puksa 23:23-00:17 LT. False blockage, rc 10SP, 7SP, 13/19SP Station Plesetskaya 23:23-23:57 LT. False blockage, rc CHAP; From 23:20 LT the interferences were observed in the train and distance radio connection by the stations Shestiozerskaya, Shozhma, Lelma, Lepsha, Plesetskaya. 22 January Station Puksa 01:19 LT. Short duration false blockage, rc 8-24SP; Station Sheleksa 01:19 LT. Short duration false blockage, rc 1/13P; Station Yemtsa 01:19 LT. Short duration false blockage, rc 2-8SP.

Additional cases of the railway anomalies during the strong geomagnetic storms in 2004 and 2005 Puksa – :16-4:40; Shalakusha-Lepsha :10-4:00; Puksa :20-11:05 20 November, Puksa: 19:52-21:30; Lepsha: 19:37-20:05; Ivaksha: 21:11-22:46; May, : Burachikha- Polokha, 1:35-3:40 LT; May, : Shalakusha-Lelma, Vandysh, 3:45-4:50

Date Maximum Kp-index Daily Ар- index Minimum Dst-variation March 13-14, April 6-7, July 15-16, September 18, March 31, April 8, April 11, November 6, November 24, October 29-31, November 20, July 23-25, November 8-10, January 21, May 8, May 15, List of geomagnetic storms with anomaly effects in the railway operating

Historical GIC Activity Monitor (from 1983) Indices of geomagnetic activity (Dst and Ap) for the period Red markers correspond to the failures in the railway operating from Gorky and Nyandoma parts reported.

Summary During the periods of great geomagnetic storms throughout the 1989, great number of failures was recorded in the russian northern railways. Failure characteristic was a short time (around 1 minute) consequence false blockage on different rail tracks that continued as a rule several hours during the active phase of geomagnetic storm and caused a delay in the train moving. Mass failures in the rail chain operating are analogous to those under ice-covered phenomena on the contact wire. Most probably, it is a result of induced electro-magnetic currents (GIC) in the short rail chains which lead to a decrease of voltages on relay contacts from ~28 to 6-7V, and to the false blockage. Anomalies occurred during the strongest geomagnetic storms, under Kp=8-9 and practically all these storms were followed by failures in the SCB system Anomalies started (with accuracy of 1 hour) in the maximum of Ap/Kp indices, but not in the minimum Dst, because Dst characterize equatorial disturbance, but Ap reflect better disturbances at the high latitudes. There is a good reason to believe that many failures that have occurred without any obvious cause on railways in the past have actually been produced by GIC. This is especially the case at high latitudes, at which geomagnetic storms and thus GIC are the largest and most frequent. Anomalies presented in this paper occur in sections where the shielding wires, along which the return current of the electric traction flows, have breaks. An aim in future studies may be to construct a model for calculating the flow of GIC in railway networks with the induced geoelectric field, together with network parameters, as the input. Some offers were suggested by the SCB laboratories to avoid such effects: exchange of throttle transformers DT by the DT C in the zone of traction sub-stations; replace steel throttle bridges by steel-cuprum ones, and made these bridges of single length and section in the rail chains shorter than 300m to minimize asymmetry in the rail chains, or, put fully transit shielding ware through the distances where it is broken now.