SECURE HASHING ALGORITHM By: Ruth Betcher. Purpose: Authentication Not Encryption Authentication Requirements: Masquerade – Insertion of message from.

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SECURE HASHING ALGORITHM By: Ruth Betcher

Purpose: Authentication Not Encryption Authentication Requirements: Masquerade – Insertion of message from fraudulent source Content Modification – Changing content of message Sequence Modification – Insertion, deletion and reordering sequence Timing Modification – Replaying valid sessions

Background Theory Message Digest or Fingerprint Condensed Representation Easy to generate for a given file. Computationally infeasible to produce two messages with same message digest Impossible to recreate a message given a message digest. Data Integrity and Comparison Checking Message Integrity Validation

Applications: One-way hash functions Public Key Algorithms – Password Logins – Encryption Key Management – Digital Signatures Integrity Checking – Virus and Malware Scanning Authentication – Secure Web Connections (PGP, SSL, SSH, S/MIME)

Variants MD4 and MD5 by Ron Rivest (1990,1994) SHA-0, SHA-1 by NSA (1993, 1995) RIPEMD-160 (1996) SHA-2 (2002 – 224, 256, 385, 512) Whirlpool Tiger GOST-3411 SHA-3 Winner selected from solicitations in 2012

Basic Hash Function Diagram

Message Diagram

SHA-1 (160 bit message) Algorithm Framework Step 1: Append Padding Bits…. Message is padded with a 1 and as many 0s as necessary to bring the message length to 64 bits fewer than an even multiple of 512. Step 2: Append Length bits are appended to the end of the padded message. These bits hold the binary format of 64 bits indicating the length of the original message. f

SHA-1 Framework Continued Step 3: Prepare Processing Functions…. SHA1 requires 80 processing functions defined as: f(t;B,C,D) = (B AND C) OR ((NOT B) AND D) ( 0 <= t <= 19) f(t;B,C,D) = B XOR C XOR D (20 <= t <= 39) f(t;B,C,D) = (B AND C) OR (B AND D) OR (C AND D) (40 <= t <=59) f(t;B,C,D) = B XOR C XOR D (60 <= t <= 79) Step 4: Prepare Processing Constants.... SHA1 requires 80 processing constant words defined as: K(t) = 0x5A ( 0 <= t <= 19) K(t) = 0x6ED9EBA1(20 <= t <= 39) K(t) = 0x8F1BBCDC (40 <= t <= 59) K(t) = 0xCA62C1D6(60 <= t <= 79)

SHA-1 Framework Continued Step 5: Initialize Buffers…. SHA1 requires 160 bits or 5 buffers of words (32 bits): H0 = 0x H1 = 0xEFCDAB89 H2 = 0x98BADCFE H3 = 0x H4 = 0xC3D2E1F0

SHA-1 Framework Final Step Step 6: Processing Message in 512-bit blocks (L blocks in total message)…. This is the main task of SHA1 algorithm which loops through the padded and appended message in 512-bit blocks. Input and predefined functions: M[1, 2,..., L]: Blocks of the padded and appended message f(0;B,C,D), f(1,B,C,D),..., f(79,B,C,D): 80 Processing Functions K(0), K(1),..., K(79): 80 Processing Constant Words H0, H1, H2, H3, H4, H5: 5 Word buffers with initial values

SHA-1 Framework Continued Step 6: Pseudo Code…. For loop on k = 1 to L (W(0),W(1),...,W(15)) = M[k] /* Divide M[k] into 16 words */ For t = 16 to 79 do: W(t) = (W(t-3) XOR W(t-8) XOR W(t-14) XOR W(t-16)) <<< 1 A = H0, B = H1, C = H2, D = H3, E = H4 For t = 0 to 79 do: TEMP = A<<<5 + f(t;B,C,D) + E + W(t) + K(t) E = D, D = C, C = B<<<30, B = A, A = TEMP End of for loop H0 = H0 + A, H1 = H1 + B, H2 = H2 + C, H3 = H3 + D, H4 = H4 + E End of for loop Output: H0, H1, H2, H3, H4, H5: Word buffers with final message digest

Message Diagram

SHA-1 Message Digest The message digest of the string: This is a test for theory of computation 4480afca b035d9debeb88bfc402db514f

Cryptanalysis and Limitation Key Premises for Hash Functions: 1. Impossible to re-create a message given a fingerprint 2. Collision Free SHA-1 failure using brute force attack in 2 80 operations Collision failure found in 2005 in 2 33 operations

Bibliography Salomon, David, Foundations of Computer Security Springer-Verlag London Limited Schneier, Bruce, Opinion: Cryptanalysis of MD% and SHA: Time for a new standard, Computer World, August Stallings, William, Cryptography and Network Security, Prentice Hall, Tanenbaum, Andrew, Computer Networks, Prentice Hall, 2003.