© Elli Louka Presentation at the School of INTERECOLAW, October 2012 The Global Regime for the Management of Nuclear Waste. - презентация

1 © Elli Louka Presentation at the School of INTERECOLAW, October 2012 The Global Regime for the Management of Nuclear Waste

2 Fukushima Accident

3 The Spent Fuel Pool, Unit 3 Fukushima

4 The Nuclear Fuel Cycle: the Back- End

5 Nuclear Graveyards for Nuclear Submarines: the UK

6 Nuclear Protests

7 Nuclear Protests 2

8 Is Mongolia the Answer?

9 Illegal Markets, Loose Nukes From January 1993 to December 2011, a total of 2164 incidents were reported to the IAEA 399 involved unauthorized possession and related criminal activities. Incidents included in this category involved illegal possession, movement or attempts to illegally trade in or use nuclear material or radioactive sources 16 incidents involved high enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium 588 incidents involved the theft or loss of nuclear or other radioactive material 124 cases involved other unauthorized activities, including the unauthorized disposal of radioactive materials or discovery of uncontrolled sources

10 Nuclear Waste Regime: treaties and instruments Convention on SNF +NW Convention on Nuclear Safety Codes of Conduct and Guidelines Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Accidents Liability

11 Joint Convention SNF and NW: Basic Goals and Ambivalence High level of safety on SNF and NW Effective defenses against hazards coming from radiation Prevention of nuclear accidents Convention does not apply to military wastes but it applies to military waste transferred from military programs to civil programs. Debate: reprocessing; transit state notification; public participation (preamble); technical cooperation (preamble); regional repositories versus disposal at the source (preamble) Lack of traditional enforcement instead peer review mechanism

12 Convention of SNF and NW: 4 types of states (about 60 state parties) States with major nuclear power programs States with large amounts of waste States with large amounts of uranium mine tailings States with hospital wastes and disused sealed sources

13 Convention on SNF and NW: issues for states Mixed wastes (hazardous+radioactive) Storage of spent fuel in reactors or storage facilities pending permanent disposal (Spent fuel at pools is not as safe as assumed, see Fukushima) Permanent Storage with the Possibility of Retrieval (see Japans seismic territory) Permanent Disposal: The agonizing experience of finding a permanent repository (money, public opposition) The Decommissioning of nuclear installations and facilities (timeframemoney) immediate decommissioning a preferred option Disused sealed sources or orphan sources (inventories, databases needed)return to manufacturer a good practice (if you can find her). By 2006 some countries have started tracking systems and national registries Repatriation of spent fuel from overseas research reactors Comprehensive cradle-to-grave services

14 Current Practices Most states have facilities for certain categories of waste (low level) In some states consultations with the public under way Some states have no plans States with small amounts of nuclear waste prefer regional options Few countries send their wastes to other countries Some countries store wastes in pools pending decision on long term disposal Other countries prefer to engage in processing to recover plutonium and uranium States have declared that public participation is better than decide, announce and defend attitude States tend not to report on the safety of spent fuel that is in storage in their nuclear power plants Classification. What is nuclear waste? Which category? criteria differ among states

15 Good Practices Development of comprehensive regulatory framework Effective independence of the regulatory body Implementation strategies with visible milestones Funding to secure waste management Education; competent staff and employees Geological repositories for high level waste National strategies for the management of disused sealed sources identifying the legal responsibilities of manufacturers, suppliers, owners and users of sealed sources for their end-of-life management (reentry of disused sources into the territory of the manufacturer, a retrieval approach of disused sources having a national origin from a foreign state)

16 Nuclear Safety and Physical Protection Convention on Nuclear Safety State with jurisdiction over a nuclear installation has responsibility for such installation (including licensing the operator) There is overlap between Nuclear Safety Convention and Convention on SNF and NW when states choose to store SNF at nuclear power plants. Peer review meetings Convention on Physical Protection Keep nuclear material+NW out of the hands of terrorists Principles: state responsibility; independent regulatory authority; primary responsibility of license holders; several layers of defense (technical, personnel, organization) to be defeated before getting access to nuclear material Quality assurance programs, emergency plans Confidentiality of information

17 Codes of Conduct IAEA Principles of Radioactive Waste Management IAEA Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movements of Radioactive Waste (provides for notification+consent of the transit states-like Basel but unlike the Joint Convention) IAEA Safety Standards for Protecting People and the Environmentall nuclear power facilities must have in place a defense in depth– a combination of independent and consecutive levels of protection (defense barriers) that would have to fail before radiation reaches people and the environment IAEA recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear materials and the design basis threatthe level of preparedness needed to stop the unauthorized access to nuclear facilities (well armed outsiders with access to insiders, armed guards?) International Code for the Safe Carriage of SNF, Plutonium and HNW on Board of Ships (INF Code)

18 Accidents + Liability

19 Secrecy versus Transparency SecrecyTransparency No detailed locations and local inventories of SNF and NW because of security Confidentiality of information regarding the physical protection of nuclear material (see convention on the physical protection of nuclear material) Energy policies have to do with national security the public has the right to know where all nuclear facilities are located, especially peoples located close to these facilities

20 Right to Information + Participation in International Law

21 PP, Representative Democracy and Direct Democracy

22 Implementation of Right to Information/Access to Justice The OSPAR arbitration case. What Ireland perceived as its right to information Estimated annual production at the MOX facility Sales volumes Probability of achieving higher sales volumes Probability to get contracts to recycle fuel in significant quantities Estimated sales demand Percentage of plutonium already on site Maximum throughput figures Lifespan of MOX facility Number of employees Price of MOX fuel Arrangements to transfer spent fuel to Sellafield and MOX from Sellafield and the number of shipments needed.

23 Yucca Mountain: United States

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25 Giant Casks: United States

26 Finlands Onkalo Permanent Disposal Site

27 How Did they Do that? PP in Finland Decisions in principle (2001 Parliament ratified decision in principle for disposal facility at Olkiluoto, Eurajoki. In 1983 decision in principle to exclude storage as long-term option for permanent waste disposal) Competition between two municipalities Local authorities coordinators Private consultants mediators Unbiased state authority on the side of municipality in terms of health (Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority) Diverse stakeholders (electric utility, disposal company, national/regional/local authorities, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Ministry of Environment, researchers from universities, local opposition movements) The debate on final disposal was de-linked from the political debate about the future of nuclear energy Economic incentives Local community retained veto power and could withdraw from the process

28 Yes but… The success of Finland may have to do with the idiosyncrasies of the country- technological enthusiasm energy independence, geopolitical stability self-sufficiency, morality and national pride (neither imports nor export of NW, nuclear energy for domestic needs, low carbon society) Moreover, not everybody is happy Weakness of opposition movements (both Olkiluoto and Lovisa good record with LLW and ILW interim storage facilities). Opposition movements did not have money to hire experts Minimal participation. Participation fatigue. Cannot influence decisions Some institutions like Ministry of Trade and Industry not neutral. Disposal company run advertising campaign It is debatable whether lessons learnt in Finland can be translated in other countries (eg Germany) that may have a history of ferocious anti-nuclear protests.

29 The Devils Advocate Best Case ScenarioWorst Case Scenario Pragmatism, technology Consultants as independent mediators Local authorities initiators, coordinators State stakeholder, impartial State neutral, the public good Find the best solution Engagement of stakeholders NGOs and the average citizen Standardization, Internationalization, and Legalization Ignore values+politics Consultants as stooge for companies Local authorities as contact points State shareholder, partial Industry-administration alliance Bias for consensus (procedure) A sales show NGOs only Routinization, ritualization. Formalized procedures do not meet the needs of public

30 Legality and Legitimacy LegalityLegitimacy

31 Instead of Conclusion Trailer of Into Eternity